• ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE - ROBERT M.PIRSIG
    21/ 03/ 2022
    As you go through the title, you'll get the impression that this is a ridiculous book: "What does Zen have to do with maintaining a motorcycle? Then there should be titles like Zen and the sale of baluts, Zen and prostitution, Zen and drug trafficking, and so on." But when we curiously flip a few pages, we would feel that this is a serious book, really serious in terms of philosophical thinking which is expressed in the form of a novel in a light, flying style. The work is a dream success for any writer: millions of copies have been sold, translated into more than twenty languages, and numerous articles praising it as "the most widely read philosophical novel of all time." The father and son's motorcycle journey across America is just a contemporary metaphor for a spiritual journey that begins with fundamental questions enquiries about the meaning of things in life through the character Phaedrus. To many pepple, these enquiries seem meaningless and out of line in a world completely dominated by the Internet and mobile phones. Even traditional intellectual pursuits centered on reflection and contemplation can now be summed up in a single word: Google. The work was written in the 1960s, when there was no Internet or smartphone, and the leisurely attitude of two people wandering the paths in search of truth and complete enlightenment (Aren’t they the ultimate goal of Zen, are they?) which seem alien, even a little too romantic, in the hustle and bustle of today's world. But it is at this strange point that the work has given the reader its greatest strength. How long have people lost their honest, innocent self that only knows how to love and accept life? Returning to our roots, reverting back to the origin to being able to see through our true self in the transparent water of enlightenment, isn't that the attitude of Zen Zong? Of course, leaving does not mean that you will definitely return, much less guarantee that you will find it. But if you do not strongly embark on the journey, will life still have any meaning? Human life is not only about birth, old age, illness, and death. As humans, we are superior to animals thanks to our sense of self-reflection to find the meaning of life. It is true that "Death comes to all men" but we still wonder to know the meaning of death, even yearning to conquer death by performing longlasting works: “Let me but leave a loyal heart shining in the pages of history." Heidegger, one of the greatest philosophers of the West, held that human existence (Dasein) is a pilgriming being to the dead (Sein zum Tode). The author of Zen and the Art of motorcycle maintenance invites us to bravely turn away from pragmatic, practical life, money, fame, envy in better-than games, to once innocently embark on a world of thinking and searching for true human values that ​​are still hidden somewhere in the endless life. In addition to being a poetic philosophical novel, Zen and the Art of motorcycle maintenance also discusses other important topics such as the relationship between philosophical thinking and scientific attitudes, the role of religion in human life, but always in a style of a writer, not of a school academic scholar, that is, gentle, profound, attractive and contemplative stemming from personal experiences more than from immersing in the books in some library. I venture to suggest that instead of requiring philosophy students to recite some boring introductory textbook, teachers should recommend this work to students so that they can initiate their own searching of wisdom for themselves. Dr. Dương Ngọc Dũng - Managing Director of Ex Libris Hermes
  • ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH - MARTIN HEIDEGGER - translated by JOHN SALLIS - PART III
    14/ 03/ 2022
    Read ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH - MARTIN HEIDEGGER - translated by JOHN SALLIS - PART I Read ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH - MARTIN HEIDEGGER - translated by JOHN SALLIS - PART II 7. Untruth as Errancy As insistent, man is turned toward the most readily available beings. But he insists only by being already ek-sistent, since, after all, he takes beings as his standard. However, in taking its standard, humanity is turned away from the mystery. The insistent turning toward what is readily available and the ek-sistent turning away from the mystery belong together. They are one and the same. Yet turning toward and away from is based on a turning to and fro proper to Dasein. Man‟s flight from the mystery toward what is readily available, onward from one current thing to the next, passing the mystery by — this is erring.* Man errs. Man does not merely stray into errancy. He is always astray in errancy, because as eksistent he in-sists and so already is caught in errancy. The errancy through which man strays is not something which, as it were, extends alongside man like a ditch into which he occasionally stumbles; rather errancy belongs to the inner constitution of the Da-sein into which historical man is admitted. Errancy is the free space for that turning in which insistent ek-sistence adroitly forgets and mistakes itself constantly anew. The concealing of the concealed being as a whole holds sway in that disclosure of specific beings, which, as forgottenness of concealment, becomes errancy. Errancy is the essential counter-essence to the primordial essence of truth. Errancy opens itself up as the open region for every opposite to essential truth. Errancy is the open site for and ground of error. Error is not just an isolated mistake but rather the realm (the domain) of the history of those entanglements in which all kinds of erring get interwoven. In conformity with its openness and its relatedness to beings as a whole, every mode of comportment has its mode of erring. Error extends from the most ordinary wasting of time, making a mistake, and miscalculating, to going astray and venturing too far in one‟s essential attitudes and decisions. However, what is ordinarily and even according to the teachings of philosophy recognized as error, incorrectness of judgments and falsity of knowledge, is only one mode of erring and, moreover, the most superficial one. The errancy in which any given segment of historical humanity must proceed for its course to be errant is essentially connected with the openness of Dasein. By leading him astray, errancy dominates man through and through. But, as leading astray, errancy at the same time contributes to a possibility that man is capable of drawing up from his ek-sistence — the possibility that, by experiencing errancy itself and by not mistaking the mystery of Da-sein, he not let himself be led astray. Because man‟s in-sistent ek-sistence proceeds in errancy, and because errancy as leading astray always oppresses in some manner or other and is formidable on the basis of this oppression of the mystery, specifically as something forgotten, in the ek-sistence of his Dasein man is especially subjected to the rule of the mystery and the oppression of errancy. He is in the needful condition of being constrained by the one and the other. The full essence of truth, including its most proper non-essence, keeps Dasein in need by this perpetual turning to and fro. Dasein is a turning into need. From man‟s Dasein and from it alone arises the disclosure of necessity and, as a result, the possibility of being transposed into what is inevitable. The disclosure of beings as such is simultaneously and intrinsically the concealing of being as a whole. In the simultaneity of disclosure and concealing errancy holds sway. Errancy and the concealing of what is concealed belong to the primordial essence of truth. Freedom, conceived on the basis of the in-sistent eksistence of Dasein, is the essence of truth (in the sense of the correctness of presenting) only because freedom itself originates from the primordial essence of truth, the rule of the mystery in errancy. Letting beings be takes its course in open comportment. However, letting beings as such be as a whole occurs in a way befitting its essence only when from time to time it gets taken up in its primordial essence. Then resolute openness toward the mystery [Ent-schlossenheit zum Geheimnis] is under way into errancy as such. Then the question of the essence of truth gets asked more originally. Then the ground of the intertwining of the essence of truth with the truth of essence reveals itself. The glimpse into the mystery out of errancy is a question — in the sense of that unique question of what being as such is as a whole. This questioning thinks the question of the Being of beings, a question that is essentially misleading and thus in its manifold meaning is still not mastered. The thinking of Being, from which such questioning primordially originates has since Plato been understood as “philosophy” and later received the title “metaphysics.” 8. Philosophy and the Question of Truth In the thinking of Being the liberation of man for ek-sistence, the liberation that grounds history, is put into words. These are not just the “expression” of an opinion but are always already the ably conserved articulation of the truth of being as a whole. How many have ears for these words matters not. Who those are that can hear them determines man‟s standpoint in history. However, in the same period in which the beginning of philosophy takes place, the marked domination of common sense (sophistry) also begins. Sophistry appeals to the unquestionable character of the beings that are opened up and interprets all thoughtful questioning as an attack on, an unfortunate irritation of, common sense. However, what philosophy is according to the estimation of common sense, which is quite justified in its own domain, does not touch on the essence of philosophy, which can be determined only on the basis of relatedness to the original truth of being as such as a whole. But because the full essence of truth contains the non-essence and above all holds sway as concealing, philosophy as a questioning into this truth is intrinsically discordant. Philosophical thinking is gentle releasement that does not renounce the concealment of being as a whole. Philosophical thinking is especially the stern and resolute openness that does not disrupt the concealing but entreats its unbroken essence into the open region of understanding and thus into its own truth. In the gentle sternness and stem gentleness with which it lets being as such be as a whole, philosophy becomes a questioning which does not cling solely to beings yet which also can allow no externally imposed decree. Kant presaged this innermost need that thinking has. For he says of philosophy: Here philosophy is seen in fact to be placed in a precarious position which is supposed to be stable—although neither in heaven nor on earth is there anything on which it depends or on which it is based. It is here that it has to prove its integrity as the keeper of its laws [Selbsthalterin ihrer Gesetze], not as the mouthpiece of laws secretly communicated to it by some implanted sense or by who knows what tutelary nature. (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Werke, Akademieausgabe IV, 425.) With this essential interpretation of philosophy, Kant, whose work introduces the final turning of Western metaphysics, envisions a domain which to be sure he could understand only on the basis of his fundamental metaphysical positions founded on subjectivity, and which he had to understand as the keeping of its laws. This essential view of the determination of philosophy nevertheless goes far enough to renounce every subjugation of philosophical thinking, the most destitute kind of which lets philosophy still be of value as an “expression” of “culture” (Spengler) and as an ornament of productive mankind. However, whether philosophy as “keeper of its laws” fulfills its primordially decisive essence, or whether it is not itself first of all kept and appointed to its task as keeper by the truth of that to which its laws pertain, this depends on the primordiality with which the original essence of truth becomes essential for thoughtful questioning. The present undertaking takes the question of the essence of truth beyond the confines of the ordinary definition provided in the usual concept of essence and helps us to consider whether the question of the essence of truth must not be, at the same time and even first of all, the question concerning the truth of essence. But in the concept of “essence” philosophy thinks Being. In tracing the inner possibility of the correctness of statements back to the eksistent freedom of letting-be as its “ground,” likewise in pointing to the essential commencement of this ground in concealing and in errancy, we want to show that the essence of truth is not the empty “generality” of an “abstract” universality but rather that which, self-concealing, is unique in the unremitting history of the disclosure of the “meaning” of what we call Being — what we for a long time have been accustomed to considering only as being as a whole. 9. Note The question of the essence of truth arises from the question of the truth of essence. In the former question essence is understood initially in the sense of whatness (quidditas) or material content (realitas), whereas truth is understood as a characteristic of knowledge. In the question of the truth of essence, essence is understood verbally; in this word, remaining still within metaphysical presentation, Being is thought as the difference that holds sway between Being and beings. Truth signifies sheltering that lightens [lichtendes Bergen] as the basic characteristic of Being. The question of the essence of truth finds its answer in the proposition the essence of truth is the truth of essence. After our explanation it can easily be seen that the proposition does not merely reverse the word order so as to conjure the specter of paradox. The subject of the proposition — if this unfortunate grammatical category may still be used at all — is the truth of essence. Sheltering that lightens is — i. e., lets essentially unfold — accordance between knowledge and beings. The proposition is not dialectical. It is no proposition at all in the sense of a statement. The answer to the question of the essence of truth is the saying of a turning [die Sage einer Kehre] within the history of Being. Because sheltering that lightens belongs to it, Being appears primordially in the light of concealing withdrawal. The name of this lighting [Lichtung] is aletheia. Already in the original project the lecture “On the Essence of Truth” was to have been completed by a second lecture “On the Truth of Essence.” The latter failed for reasons that are now indicated in the “Letter on Humanism.” The decisive question (in Being and Time, 1927) of the meaning, i. e., of the project-domain (cf. p. 151), i. e., of the openness, i. e., of the truth of Being and not merely of beings, remains intentionally undeveloped. Our thinking apparently remains on the path of metaphysics. Nevertheless, in its decisive steps, which lead from truth as correctness to ek-sistent freedom, and from the latter to truth as concealing and as errancy, it accomplishes a change in the questioning that belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics. The thinking attempted in the lecture comes to fulfillment in the essential experience that a nearness to the truth of Being is first prepared for historical man on the basis of the Dasein into which man can enter. Every kind of anthropology and all subjectivity of man as subject is not merely left behind — as it was already in Being and Time — and the truth of Being sought as the ground of a transformed historical position; rather, the movement of the lecture is such that it sets out to think from this other ground (Dasein). The course of the questioning is intrinsically the way of a thinking which, instead of furnishing representations and concepts, experiences and tries itself as a transformation of its relatedness to Being.
  • ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH - MARTIN HEIDEGGER - translated by JOHN SALLIS - PART II
    07/ 03/ 2022
    Read ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH - MARTIN HEIDEGGER - translated by JOHN SALLIS - PART I 4. The Essence of Freedom However, indication of the essential connection between truth as correctness and freedom uproots those preconceptions — granted of course that we are prepared for a transformation of thinking. Consideration of the essential connection between truth and freedom leads us to pursue the question of the essence of man in a regard which assures us an experience of a concealed essential ground of man (of Dasein), and in such a manner that the experience transposes us in advance into the originally essential domain of truth. But here it becomes evident also that freedom is the ground of the inner possibility of correctness only because it receives its own essence from the more original essence of uniquely essential truth. Freedom was first determined as freedom for what is opened up in an open region. How is this essence of freedom to be thought? That which is opened up, that to which a presentative statement as correct corresponds, are beings opened up in an open comportment. Freedom for what is opened up in an open region lets beings be the beings they are. Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be. Ordinarily we speak of letting be whenever, for example, we forgo some enterprise that has been planned. “We let something be” means we do not touch it again, we have nothing more to do with it. To let something be has here the negative sense of letting it alone, of renouncing it, of indifference and even neglect. However, the phrase required now — to let beings be — does not refer to neglect and indifference but rather the opposite. To let be is to engage oneself with beings. On the other hand, to be sure, this is not to be understood only as the mere management, preservation, tending, and planning of the beings in each case encountered or sought out. To let be — that is, to let beings be as the beings which they are — means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself. Western thinking in its beginning conceived this open region as ta alethea the unconcealed. If we translate aletheia as "unconcealment" rather than “truth,” this translation is not merely more literal; it contains the directive to rethink the ordinary concept of truth in the sense of the correctness of statements and to think it back to that still uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings. To engage oneself with the disclosedness of beings is not to lose oneself in them; rather, such engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are and in order that presentative correspondence might take its standard from them. As this letting-be, it exposes itself to beings as such and transposes all comportment into the open region. Letting-be, i. e., freedom, is intrinsically exposing, ek-sistent. Considered in regard to the essence of truth, the essence of freedom manifests itself as exposure to the disclosedness of beings. Freedom is not merely what common sense is content to let pass under this name: the caprice, turning up occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or that direction. Freedom is not mere absence of constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor is it on the other hand mere readiness for what is required and necessary (and so somehow a being). Prior to all this (“negative” and “positive” freedom), freedom is engagement in the disclosure of beings as such. Disclosedness itself is conserved in ek-sistent engagement, through which the openness of the open region, i. e., the “there” [“Da”], is what it is. In Da-sein the essential ground, long ungrounded, on the basis of which man is able to ek-sist, is preserved for him. Here “existence” does not mean existentia in the sense of occurring or being at hand. Nor on the other hand does it mean, in an “existentiell” fashion, man‟s moral endeavor in behalf of his “self,” based on his psychophysical constitution. Ek-sistence, rooted in truth as freedom, is exposure to the disclosedness of beings as such. Still uncomprehended, indeed, not even in need of an essential grounding, the ek-sistence of historical man begins at that moment when the first thinker takes a questioning stand with regard to the unconcealment of beings by asking: what are beings? In this question unconcealment is experienced for the first time. Being as a whole reveals itself as physis, “nature,” which here does not yet mean a particular sphere of beings but rather beings as such as a whole, specifically in the sense of emerging presence [aufgehendes Anwesen]. History begins only when beings themselves are expressly drawn up into their unconcealment and conserved in it, only when this conservation is conceived on the basis of questioning regarding beings as such. The primordial disclosure of being as a whole, the question concerning beings as such, and the beginning of Western history are the same; they occur together in a “time” which, itself unmeasurable, first opens up the open region for every measure. But if ek-sistent Da-sein, which lets beings be, sets man free for his “freedom” by first offering to his choice something possible (a being) and by imposing on him something necessary (a being), human caprice does not then have freedom at its disposal. Man does not “possess” freedom as a property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sis tent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses man — so originally that only it secures for humanity that distinctive relatedness to being as a whole as such which first founds all history. Only ek-sistent man is historical. “Nature” has no history. Freedom, understood as letting beings be, is the fulfillment and consummation of the essence of truth in the sense of the disclosure of beings. “Truth” is not a feature of correct propositions which are asserted of an “object” by a human “subject” and then are valid” somewhere, in what sphere we know not. Rather, truth is disclosure of beings through which an openness essentially unfolds [west]. All human comportment and bearing are exposed in its open region. Therefore man is in the manner of ek-sistence. Because every mode of human comportment is in its own way open and plies itself to that toward which it comports itself, the restraint of letting-be, i. e., freedom, must have granted it its endowment of that inner directive for correspondence of presentator to beings. That man ek-sists now means that for historical human ity the history of its essential possibilities is conserved in the disclosure of beings as a whole. The rare and the simple decisions of history arise from the way the original essence of truth essentially unfolds. However, because truth is in essence freedom, historical man can, in letting beings be, also not let beings be the beings which they are and as they are. Then beings are covered up and distorted. Semblance comes to power. In it the non-essence of truth comes to the fore. However, because ek-sistent freedom as the essence of truth is not a property of man; because on the contrary man eksists and so becomes capable of history only as the property of this freedom; the non-essence of truth cannot first arise subsequently from mere human incapacity and negligence. Rather, untruth must derive from the essence of truth. Only because truth and untruth are, in essence, not irrelevant to one another but rather belong together is it possible for a true proposition to enter into pointed opposition to the corresponding untrue proposition. The question concerning the essence of truth thus first reaches the original domain of what is at issue when, on the basis of a prior glimpse of the full essence of truth, it has included a consideration of untruth in its unveiling of that essence. Discussion of the non-essence of truth is not the subsequent filling of a gap but rather the decisive step toward an adequate posing of the question concerning the essence of truth. Yet how are we to comprehend the non-essence in the essence of truth? If the essence of truth is not exhausted by the correctness of statements, then neither can untruth be equated with the incorrectness of judgments. 5. The Essence of Truth The essence of truth reveals itself as freedom. The latter is ek-sistent, disclosive letting beings be. Every mode of open comportment flourishes in letting beings be and in each case is a comportment to this or that being. As engagement in the disclosure of being as a whole as such, freedom has already attuned all comportment to being as a whole. However, being attuned (attunement) can never be understood as “experience and “feeling,” because it is thereby simply deprived of its essence. For here it is interpreted on the basis of something (“life” and “soul”) that can maintain the semblance of the title of essence only as long as it bears in itself the distortion and misinterpretation of being attuned. Being attuned, i. e., ek-sistent exposedness to beings as a whole, can be “experienced" and “felt” only because the “man who "experiences" without being aware of the essence of the attunement, is always engaged in being attuned in a way that discloses beings as a whole. Every mode of historical man‟s comportment whether accentuated or not, whether understood or not — is attuned and by this attunement is drawn up into beings as a whole. The openedness of being as a whole does not coincide with the sum of all immediately familiar beings. On the contrary: where beings are not very familiar to man and are scarcely and only roughly known by science, the openedness of beings as a whole can prevail more essentially than it can where the familiar and well-known has become boundless, and nothing is any longer able to withstand the business of knowing, since technical mastery over things bears itself without limit. Precisely in the leveling and planning of this omniscience, this mere knowing, the openedness of beings gets flattened out into the apparent nothingness of what is no longer even a matter of indifference but rather is simply forgotten. Letting beings be, which is an attuning, a bringing into accord, prevails throughout and anticipates all the open comportment that flourishes in it. Man‟s comportment is brought into definite accord throughout by the openedness of being as a whole. However, from the point of view of everyday calculations and preoccupations this “as a whole” appears to be incalculable and incomprehensible. It cannot be understood on the basis of the beings opened up in any given case, whether they belong to nature or to history. Although it ceaselessly brings everything into definite accord, still it remains indefinite, indeterminable; it then coincides for the most part with what is most fleeting and most unconsidered. However, what brings into accord is not nothing but rather a concealing of beings as a whole. Precisely because letting be always lets beings be in a particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing. In the ek-sistent freedom of Dasein a concealing of being as a whole comes to pass [ereignet sichj. Here there is concealment. 6. Untruth as Concealing Concealment deprives aletheia of disclosure yet does not render it steresis (privation); rather, concealment preserves what is most proper to aletheia as its own. Considered with respect to truth as disclosedness, concealment is then undisclosedness and accordingly the untruth that is most proper to the essence of truth. The concealment of beings as a whole does not first show up subsequently as a consequence of the fact that knowledge of beings is always fragmentary. The concealment of beings as a whole, untruth proper, is older than every openedness of this or that being. It is also older than letting-be itself which in disclosing already holds concealed and comports itself toward concealing. What conserves letting-be in this relatedness to concealing? Nothing less than the concealing of what is concealed as a whole, of beings as such, i. e., the mystery; not a particular mystery regarding this or that, but rather the one mystery — that, in general, mystery (the concealing of what is concealed) as such holds sway throughout man‟s Dasein. In letting beings as a whole be, which discloses and at the same time conceals, it happens that concealing appears as what is first of all concealed. Insofar as it ek-sists, Da-sein conserves the first and broadest undisclosedness, untruth proper. The proper non-essence of truth is the mystery. Here non-essence does not yet have the sense of inferiority to essence in the sense of what is general (koinon genos), its possibilitas and the ground of its possibility. Non-essence is here what in such a sense would be a pre-essential essence. But "non-essence" means at first and for the most part the deformation of that already inferior essence. Indeed, in each of these significations the non-essence remains always in its own way essential to the essence and never becomes inessential in the sense of irrelevant. But to speak of non-essence and untruth in this manner goes very much against the grain of ordinary opinion and looks like a dragging up of forcibly contrived paradoxes. Because it is difficult to eliminate this impression, such a way of speaking, paradoxical only for ordinary doxa (opinion), is to be renounced. But surely for those who know about such matters the “non-” of the primordial non-essence of truth, as untruth, points to the still unexperienced domain of the truth of Being (not merely of beings). As letting beings be, freedom is intrinsically the resolutely open bearing that does not close up in itself. All comportment is grounded in this bearing and receives from it directedness toward beings and disclosure of them. Nevertheless, this bearing toward concealing conceals itself in the process, letting a forgottenness of the mystery take precedence and disappearing in it. Certainly man takes his bearings [verhalt sich] constantly in his comportment toward beings; but for the most part he acquiesces in this or that being and its particular openedness. Man clings to what is readily available and controllable even where ultimate matters are concerned. And if he sets out to extend, change, newly assimilate, or secure the openedness of the beings pertaining to the most various domains of his activity and interest, then he still takes his directives from the sphere of readily available intentions and needs. However, to reside in what is readily available is intrinsically not to let the concealing of what is concealed hold sway. Certainly among readily familiar things there are also some that are puzzling, unexplained, undecided, questionable. But these self-certain questions are merely transitional, intermediate points in our movement within the readily familiar and thus not essential. Wherever the concealment of beings as a whole is conceded only as a limit that occasionally announces itself, concealing as a fundamental occurrence has sunk into forgottenness. But the forgotten mystery of Dasein is not eliminated by the forgottenness; rather, the forgottenness bestows on the apparent disappearance of what is forgotten a peculiar presence [Gegenwart]. By disavowing itself in and for forgottenness, the mystery leaves historical man in the sphere of what is readily available to him, leaves him to his own resources. Thus left, humanity replenishes its “world” on the basis of the latest needs and aims, and fills out that world by means of proposing and planning. From these man then takes his standards, forgetting being as a whole. He persists in them and continually supplies himself with new standards, yet without considering either the ground for taking up standards or the essence of what gives the standard. In spite of his advance to new standards and goals, man goes wrong as regards the essential genuineness of his standards. He is all the more mistaken the more exclusively he takes himself, as subject, to be the standard for all beings. The inordinate forgetfulness of humanity persists in securing itself by means of what is readily available and always accessible. This persistence has its unwitting support in that bearing by which Dasein not only ek-sists but also at the same time in-sists, i. e., holds fast to what is offered by beings, as if they were open of and in themselves. As ek-sistent, Dasein is insistent. Even in insistent existence the mystery holds sway, but as the forgotten and hence “inessential” essence of truth.
  • ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH - MARTIN HEIDEGGER - translated by JOHN SALLIS - PART I
    28/ 02/ 2022
    This work was first published in 1943 under the name Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. The English version On The Essence of Truth was translated by John Sallis, published in Pathmarks, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1930]1998, pp. 136-137. Ex Libris Hermes will post this edition into 3 parts. Our topic is the essence of truth. The question regarding the essence of truth is not concerned with whether truth is a truth of practical experience or of economic calculation, the truth of a technical consideration or of political sagacity, or, in particular, a truth of scientific research or of artistic composition, or even the truth of thoughtful reflection or of cultic belief. The question of essence disregards all this and attends to the one thing that in general distinguishes every “truth” as truth. Yet with this question concerning essence do we not soar too high into the void of generality which deprives all thinking of breath? Does not the extravagance of such questioning bring to light the groundlessness of all philosophy? A radical thinking that turns to what is actual must surely from the first insist bluntly on establishing the actual truth which today gives us a measure and a stand against the confusion of opinions and reckonings. In the face of this actual need what use is the question concerning the essence of truth, this “abstract” question that disregards everything actual? Is not the question of essence the most inessential and superfluous that could be asked? No one can evade the evident certainty of these considerations. None can lightly neglect their compelling seriousness. But what is it that speaks in these considerations? “Sound” common sense. It harps on the demand for palpable utility and inveighs against knowledge of the essence of beings, which essential knowledge has long been called “philosophy.” Common sense has its own necessity; it asserts its rights with the weapon peculiarly suitable to it, namely, appeal to the “obviousness of its claims and considerations. However, philosophy can never refute common sense, for the latter is deaf to the language of philosophy. Nor may it even wish to do so, since common sense is blind to what philosophy sets before its essential vision. Moreover, we ourselves remain within the sensibleness of common sense to the extent that we suppose ourselves to be secure in those multiform “truths” of practical experience and action, of research, composition, and belief. We ourselves intensify that resistance which the “obvious” has to every demand made by what is questionable. Therefore even if some questioning concerning truth is necessary, what we then demand is an answer to the question as to where we stand today. We want to know what our situation is today. We call for the goal which should be posited for man in and for his history. We want the actual “truth.” Well then — truth! But in calling for the actual “truth” we must already know what truth as such means. Or do we know this only by “feeling” and in a general way”? But is not such vague “knowing” and our indifference regarding it more desolate than sheer ignorance of the essence of truth? 1. The Usual Concept of Truth What do we ordinarily understand by “truth”? This elevated yet at the same time worn and almost dulled word “truth” means what makes a true thing true. What is a true thing? We say, for example, “It is a true joy to cooperate in the accomplishment of this task.” We mean that it is purely and actually a joy. The true is the actual. Accordingly, we speak of true gold in distinction from false. False gold is not actually what it appears to be. It is merely a “semblance” and thus is not actual. What is not actual is taken to be the opposite of the actual. But what merely seems to be gold is nevertheless something actual. Accordingly, we say, more precisely, actual gold is genuine gold. Yet both are “actual,” the circulating counterfeit no less than the genuine gold. What is true about genuine gold thus cannot be demonstrated merely by its actuality. The question recurs: what do “genuine” and “true” mean here? Genuine gold is that actual gold the actuality of which is in accordance [in der Ubereinstimmung steht] with what, always and in advance, we “properly” mean by “gold.” Conversely, wherever we suspect false gold, we say: “Here something is not in accord” [stimmt nicht]. On the other hand, we say of whatever is “as it should be”: “It is in accord.” The matter is in accord [Die Sache stimmt]. However, we call true not only an actual joy, genuine gold, and all beings of such kind, but also and above all we call true or false our statements about beings, which can themselves be genuine or not with regard to their kind, which can be thus or otherwise in their actuality. A statement is true if what it means and says is in accordance with the matter about which the statement is made. Here too we say, “It is in accord.” Now, though, it is not the matter that is in accord but rather the proposition. The true, whether it be a matter or a proposition, is what accords, the accordant [das Stimmende]. Being true and truth here signify accord, and that in a double sense: on the one hand, the consonance [Einstimmigkeit] of a matter with what is supposed in advance regarding it and, on the other hand, the accordance of what is meant in the statement with the matter. This dual character of the accord is brought to light by the traditional definition of truth: veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. This can be taken to mean: truth is the correspondence [Angleichungl of the matter to knowledge. But it can also be taken as saying: truth is the correspondence of knowledge to the matter. Admittedly, the above definition is usually stated only in the formula veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem [truth is the adequation of intellect to thing] Yet truth so conceived, propositional truth, is possible only on the basis of material truth [Sachwahrheit], of adaequatio rei ad intellectum [adequation of thing to intellect ]. Both concepts of the essence of veritas have continually in view a conforming to ... [Sichrichten nach . .]‟ and hence think truth as correctness [Richtigkeit]. Nonetheless, the one is not the mere inversion of the other. On the contrary, in each case intellectus and res are thought differently. In order to recognize this we must trace the usual formula for the ordinary concept of truth back to its most recent (i. e., the medieval) origin. Veritas as adaequatio rei ad intellectum does not imply the later transcendental conception of Kant — possible only on the basis of the subjectivity of man‟s essence — that “objects conform to our knowledge.” Rather, it implies the Christian theological belief that, with respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as created (ens creatum), is only insofar as it corresponds to the idea preconceived in the intellectus divinus, i. e., in the mind of God, and thus measures up to the idea (is correct) and in this sense is “true.” The intellectus humanus too is an ens creatum. As a capacity bestowed upon man by God, it must satisfy its idea. But the understanding measures up to the idea only by accomplishing in its propositions the correspondence of what is thought to the matter, which in its turn must be in conformity with the idea. If all beings are “created,” the possibility of the truth of human knowledge is grounded in the fact that matter and proposition measure up to the idea in the same way and therefore are fitted to each other on the basis of the unity of the divine plan of creation. Veritas as adaequatio rei (creandae) ad intellectum (divinum) guarantees veritas as adaequatio intellectus (humani) ad rem (creatam). Throughout, veritas essentially implies convenientia, the coming of beings themselves, as created, into agreement with the Creator, an “accord” with regard to the way they are determined in the order of creation. But this order, detached from the notion of creation, can also be represented in a general and indefinite way as a world-order. The theologically conceived order of creation is replaced by the capacity of all objects to be planned by means of a worldly reason [Weltvernunft] which supplies the law for itself and thus also claims that its procedure is immediately intelligible (what is considered “logical”). That the essence of propositional truth consists in the correctness of statements needs no further special proof. Even where an effort is made — with a conspicuous lack of success — to explain how correctness is to occur, it is already presupposed as being the essence of truth. Likewise, material truth always signifies the consonance of something at hand with the "rational" concept of its essence. The impression arises that this definition of the essence of truth is independent of the interpretation of the essence of the Being of all beings, which always includes a corresponding interpretation of the essence of man as the bearer and executor of intellectus. Thus the formula for the essence of truth (veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei) comes to have its general validity as something immediately evident to everyone. Under the domination of the obviousness which this concept of truth seems to have but which is hardly attended to as regards its essential grounds, it is considered equally obvious that truth has an opposite, and that there is untruth. The untruth of the proposition (incorrectness) is the non-accordance of the statement with the matter. The untruth of the matter (non-genuineness) signifies non-agreement of a being with its essence. In each case untruth is conceived as a non-accord. The latter falls outside the essence of truth. Therefore when it is a question of comprehending the pure essence of truth, untruth, as such an opposite of truth, can be put aside. But then is there any further need at all for a special unveiling of the essence of truth? Is not the pure essence of truth already adequately represented in the generally accepted concept, which is upset by no theory and is secured by its obviousness? Moreover, if we take the tracing back of propositional truth to material truth to be what in the first instance it shows itself to be, namely a theological explanation, and if we then keep the philosophical definition completely pure of all admixture of theology and limit the concept of truth to propositional truth, then we encounter an old — though not the oldest — tradition of thinking, according to which truth is the accordance (homoiosis) of a statement (logos) with a matter (pragma). What is it about statements that here remains still worthy of question — granted that we know what is meant by accordance of a statement with the matter? Do we know that? 2. The Inner Possibility of Accordance We speak of accordance in various senses. We say, for example, considering two five-mark coins lying on the table: they are in accordance with one another. They come into accord in the oneness of their outward appearance. Hence they have the latter in common, and thus they are in this regard alike. Furthermore, we speak of accordance whenever, for example, we state regarding one of the five-mark coins: this coin is round. Here the statement is in accordance with the thing. Now the relation obtains, not between thing and thing, but rather between a statement and a thing. But wherein are the thing and the statement supposed to be in accordance, considering that the relata are manifestly different in their outward appearance? The coin is made of metal. The statement is not material at all. The coin is round. The statement has nothing at all spatial about it. With the coin something can be purchased. The statement about it is never a means of payment. But in spite of all their dissimilarity the above statement, as true, is in accordance with the coin. And according to the usual concept of truth this accord is supposed to be a correspondence. How can what is completely dissimilar, the statement, correspond to the coin? It would have to become the coin and in this way relinquish itself entirely. The statement never succeeds in doing that. The moment it did, it would no longer be able as a statement to be in accordance with the thing. In the correspondence the statement must remain — indeed even first become — what it is. In what does its essence, so thoroughly different from every thing, consist? How is the statement able to correspond to something else, the thing, precisely by persisting in its own essence? Correspondence here cannot signify a thing-like approximation between dissimilar kinds of things. The essence of the correspondence is determined rather by the kind of relation that obtains between the statement and the thing. As long as this “relation” remains undetermined and is not grounded in its essence, all dispute over the possibility and impossibility, over the nature and degree, of the correspondence loses its way in a void. But the statement regarding the coin relates “itself” to this thing in that it presents [vor-stellt) it and says of the presented how, according to the particular perspective that guides it, it is disposed. What is stated by the presentative statement is said of the presented thing in just such manner as that thing, as presented, is. The “such-as” has to do with the presenting and its presented. Disregarding all „„psychological‟‟ preconceptions as well as those of any „„theory of consciousness,” to present here means to let the thing stand opposed as object. As thus placed, what stands opposed must traverse an open field of opposedness (Entgegen) and nevertheless must maintain its stand as a thing and show itself as something withstanding [ein Standiges] This appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes place within an open region, the openness of which is not first created by the presenting but rather is only entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness. The relation of the presentative statement to the thing is the accomplishment of that bearing [Verhaltnis] which originally and always comes to prevail as a comportment [Verhalten]. But all comportment is distinguished by the fact that, standing in the open region, it adheres to something opened up as such. What is thus opened up, solely in this strict sense, was experienced early in Western thinking as “what is present” and for a long time has been named “being.” Comportment stands open to beings. Every open relatedness is a comportment. Man‟s open stance varies depending on the kind of beings and the way of comportment. All working and achieving, all action and calculation, keep within an open region within which beings, with regard to what they are and how they are, can properly take their stand and become capable of being said. This can occur only if beings present themselves along with the presentative statement so that the latter subordinates itself to the directive that it speak of beings such as they are. In following such a directive the statement conforms to beings. Speech that directs itself accordingly is correct (true). What is thus said is the correct (the true). A statement is invested with its correctness by the openness of comportment; for only through the latter can what is opened up really become the standard for the presentative correspondence. Open comportment must let itself be assigned this standard. This means that it must take over a pregiven standard for all presenting. This belongs to the openness of comportment. But if the correctness (truth) of statements becomes possible only through this openness of comportment, then what first makes correctness possible must with more original right be taken as the essence of truth. Thus the traditional assignment of truth exclusively to staternents as the sole essential locus of truth falls away. Truth does not originally reside in the proposition. But at the same time the question arises of the ground of the inner possibility of the open comportment which pregives a standard, which possibility alone lends to propositional correctness the appearance of fulfilling the essence of truth at all. 3. The Ground of the possibility of Correctness Whence does the presentative statement receive the directive to conform to the object and to accord by way of correctness? Why is this accord involved in determining the essence of truth? How can something like the accomplishment of a pregiven directedness occur? And how can the initiation into an accord occur? Only if this pregiving has already entered freely into an open region for something opened up which prevails there and which binds every presenting. To free oneself for a binding directedness is possible only by being free for what is opened up in an open region. Such being free points to the heretofore uncomprehended essence of freedom. The openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of correctness is grounded in freedom. The essence of truth is freedom. But does not this proposition regarding the essence of correctness substitute one obvious item for another? In order to be able to carry out any act, and therefore one of presentative stating and even of according or not according with a “truth,” the actor must of course be free. However, the proposition in question does not really mean that an unconstrained act belongs to the execution of the statement, to its pronouncement and reception; rather, the proposition says that freedom is the essence of truth itself. In this connection „„essence" is understood as the ground of the inner possibility of what is initially and generally admitted as known. Nevertheless, in the concept of freedom we do not think truth, and certainly not at all its essence. The proposition that the essence of truth (correctness of statements) is freedom must consequently seem strange. To place the essence of truth in freedom — doesn‟t this mean to submit truth to human caprice? Can truth be any more radically undermined than by being surrendered to the arbitrariness of this “wavering reed”? What forced itself upon sound judgment again and again in the previous discussion now all the more clearly comes to light: truth is here driven back to the subjectivity of the human subject. Even if an objectivity is also accessible to this subject, still such objectivity remains along with subjectivity something human and at man‟s disposal. Certainly deceit and dissimulation, lies and deception, illusion and semblance — in short, all kinds of untruth — are ascribed to man. But of course untruth is also the opposite of truth. For this reason, as the non-essence of truth, it is appropriately excluded from the sphere of the question concerning the pure essence of truth. This human origin of untruth indeed only serves to confirm by contrast the essence of truth “in itself” as holding sway “beyond” man. Metaphysics regards such truth as the imperishable and eternal, which can never be founded on the transitoriness and fragility that belong to man‟s essence. How then can the essence of truth still have its subsistence and its ground in human freedom? Resistance to the proposition that the essence of truth is freedom is based on preconceptions, the most obstinate of which is that freedom is a property of man. The essence of freedom neither needs nor allows any further questioning. Everyone knows what man is. Read ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH - MARTIN HEIDEGGER - translated by JOHN SALLIS - PART II
  • LESSONS IN STOICISM BY JOHN SELLARS REVIEW - WHAT ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS TEACH US ABOUT HOW TO LIVE
    07/ 02/ 2022
    Why are the Stoics’ ideas so popular today – is it self-help, or a lurking machismo? On 9 September 1965, during the war between Vietnam and the US, James Stockdale, an American fighter pilot, inadvertently flew his small A-4 Skyhawk into a flak trap. He later recalled his thoughts as he ejected and contemplated his impending capture: “Five years down there, at least. I’m leaving the world of technology and entering the world of Epictetus.” We all react differently, and unpredictably, in moments of great peril: in this case Stockdale was drawn back to an inspirational philosophy class he had taken three years earlier, and to a period when he was obsessively reading a relatively little-known ancient Greek philosopher. Epictetus himself was a former slave who taught Stoic philosophy in the late first and early second centuries, first in Rome and then in northern Greece. Along with the Roman writers Seneca and (the emperor) Marcus Aurelius, he left us the longest surviving treatises on Stoicism, an ancient Greek philosophical doctrine that originated in the third century BCE. The Stoics (who originally gathered in the stoa or colonnade in the Athenian agora) offered a comprehensive theory of existence, covering physics, language, psychology, theology, sense perception and much more; but the doctrine was at its base an art of good living. We should concern ourselves only with what we can control (what is eph’hēmin, “up to us”), and leave the rest; we must pursue only things of real value such as enhancing collective happiness, not “things of indifference” such as wealth and the respect of our peers; we must allow ourselves to be guided by reason, and not dominated by the passions, which lessen our self-control. These were the lessons that Stockdale repeated to himself through what turned out to be seven and a half years of often brutal captivity. “You may fetter my leg,” Epictetus had written, “but not even Zeus himself can overpower my will.” In turning to Stoicism, Stockdale was ahead of his time. Particularly over the last 15 years, interest in it has surged, with articles, blogs, journals and groups springing up everywhere. Even Steve Bannon and the alt-right have been getting in on the act — although, as Donna Zuckerberg has shown, engagement on the part of this particular community can be pretty superficial, and members are in reality more likely to be found reading memes than Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations. John Sellars is one of the founders of Modern Stoicism, a group that promotes Stoicism as a constructive response to contemporary life: among their activities is Stoic Week, in which those signed up are encouraged to apply Stoic principles to their life-choices for seven days. Lessons in Stoicism represents his attempt to distil key Stoic tenets, insofar as they can help contemporary readers, into under 100 small pages. Sellars achieves the task he sets himself admirably. In elegant, economical prose, he urges us to become better, happier people by focusing on rational decision-making. This is Stoicism not in its popularised sense (the grin-and-bear-it ideology of Victorian public schools) but as self-empowerment through reasoned deliberation. Once you have learned to clarify which choices are available to you, and what their likely consequences will be, you will be better equipped to deal both with trials of adversity and the temptations of success. Certainly, translating ancient philosophical texts into guiding principles for modern living can lead to simplification and distortion. Ancient Stoicism was much more broad-ranging, complex, and indeed weird, than Sellars lets on. You won’t read anything here about the theory of language based on cognitive impressions or the idea that the universe goes through periodic cycles of conflagration and renewal. Sellars skirts the Stoics’ belief in a designer deity, arguing that ‘God’ is simply a way of thinking about nature and the animate interconnectedness of the universe (and comparing James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis). But this underplays the role of providence: ancient Stoics and Stoic-influenced writers often speak about their god as supremely rational and ordering the events of the world for the best. Philosophers both ancient and modern have struggled with this tendency in Stoicism towards determinism, and the question of where it leaves individual agency. Just occasionally, we get a glimpse of fundamental incompatibilities between ancient Greco-Roman and modern liberal values – particularly in the areas of sex and gender. For example, the Roman Stoic Musonius Rufus is saluted for his argument that women can practise philosophy just as well as men, and thereby proposing “some form of gender equality”. But Sellars doesn’t give us the full story. What Musonius actually thought was that women and men are differently equipped by nature. Learning philosophy does not make women equal to men; it just makes them better at the tasks to which they’re suited (spinning, weaving, childrearing). Some of Sellars’s paraphrases of ancient ideas, moreover, may accurately reflect ancient beliefs, but sit rather awkwardly in a 21st-century ethical context: for example, “none of us has chosen our … gender”; “a healthy relationship is one based on natural desires for companionship and procreation”. But what is striking is not that ancient and modern thought sometimes misalign: it’s that, in spite of that misalignment, Stoicism retains so much appeal for modern readers. The reasons for this popularity are several. There is certainly an extent to which Stoicism responds to modern “self-help” culture. There is also a kind of lurking machismo to its heroisation of endurance and suffering. Most of all, however, it is that maligned, embattled, but nonetheless tenacious idea of rationality that keeps drawing the readers. Few today would agree that reason alone could ever be sovereign in human decision-making, to the exclusion of emotions, group dynamics, the unconscious, the body, and instincts honed by evolutionary adaptation. But it is reason alone that can help us change, develop and take control of our lives; and the Stoic message that we must do all we can to nurture this powerful but brittle gift is timeless and ever-necessary. Source: The Guardian
  • EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM BY JEAN-PAUL SARTRE
    17/ 01/ 2022
    Existentialism Is a Humanism was originally a public lecture of Sartre at Club Maintenant on Oct 12th, 1945, then published in books and released by Nagel publisher in 1946. Existentialism Is a Humanism, French original edition, published by Nagel publisher Vietnamese translation Among Jean-Paul Sartre's masterpieces, this thin book has been the most widely read in the past 80 years, because unlike other writings which are written in an academic penmanship and dense with incomprehensible technical terms, it is the most popular, simply written  and rarely are philosophical jargons used. Moreover, it contains all the central issues of Sartre's existential ideology, so reading this work can give commoners a basic sense of his philosophy. Within the framework of this book review, we only mention Sartre's ideas about human, and other issues will be presented later. In the face of criticism of existentialism from many sides, especially the Christians and Marxists, Sartre felt responsible for redefining the position of existentialism. First of all, he identified two branches of existentialism: Christian existentialism represented by Karl Jasper and Gabriel Marcel and Atheistic existentialism represented by him and Martin Heidegger. What these two branches have in common is that existential philosophers take "existence precedes essence” as the basic idea. With the thesis "existence precedes essence," Sartre wanted to counter the essentialism in the Western metaphysical historical tradition, which was a theory that logically essence always precedes existence. This philosophical legacy, criticized by Sartre, will inevitably lead to a deterministic tendency in the question of human status, and thus to destroy human freedom. According to Sartre, for things and other animals, their essence always precedes their existence, but humans, on the contrary, the so-called "essence" of a person who designates his or her life through projections and actions; in other words, to have essence, humans must first exist in this life. From there, Sartre jumped to the first principle of existentialism as a humanism: "Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself." Man is free, but in order to avoid falling back into the essentialism, Sartre notes to us that freedom itself is not a human property, but a human being condition. As such, humans are first a project (projet), which means “throw ourselves forward into the future“ to open up the possibilities or horizons that exist for themselves. In projection, humans face choices (choix): choosing what they will be. When choosing what he will be or who he will be, human beings choose to take actions to realize that choice, and therefore he will not avoid a sense of responsibility (responsabilité) for all his decisions. If human freedom is absolute, so is his responsibility. But this doesn't imply an individualistic thing, because according to Sartre, it's of course an individual act when choosing, but in doing so, we "choose everyone." 35), "in choosing myself, I choose man." On the basis of the ideology of freedom and responsibility, Sartre mentions three dimensions of human existence: Anxiety, abandonment, and despair. "Humans are anxiety." 37), which means that our fate is not separate from the fate of others, that all decisions we make are in solidarity with others, so when we act, we "can't get rid of our sense of comprehensive and deep responsibility. So anxiety (angoisse) is a part of act, a dimension of human existence. Every denial of anxiety is bad faith. Abandonedness (délaissement) is just a way of saying that God does not exist and that man must bear the consequences of his actions on his own. In that state, human beings have no support to hold on to, and humans have no choice but to “invent himself.” Despair (désespoir) is to say that when you do something, you have no one to rely on, you can only count on yourself. From all above, Sartre claims that existentialism is not a kind of quietism (quiétisme) that lulls humans but a theory of acts through defining humans by acts; it's not a pessimistic description of humans but an optimistic theory that shows that human destiny is made by himself.
  • DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD BY RENÉ DESCARTES
    10/ 01/ 2022
    René Descartes (1596-1650) is a great French mathematician, scientist, and philosopher. According to the Britannica Encyclopedia, he is regarded as "the founder of modern philosophy" for three following reasons: firstly, he was one of the first to reject Scholastic Aristotelianism; secondly, he established the first modern version of body-mind dualism, from which given rise to the problems of body-mind, and thirdly, he advocated the development of science based on observation and experimentation. Discourse on the Method, its full name, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences, is one of the most influential works in modern philosophy history. Interestingly, while most scholarly people at that time wrote in Latin, Descartes wrote this in French, which was thought to be cheap, unintelligent and unable to express academic problems. Because he wanted it to be comprehensible to anyone who has a common sense, as his witty way of speaking about the book “of which I wanted even women to understand something”. Title page of Discourse on the Method by Descartes, first edition, 1637 Vietnamese translation by Trần Thái Đỉnh with the title Phương Pháp luận Vietnamese translation by Nguyễn Văn Châu và Cao Văn Luận with the title Phương Pháp luận This work is divided into 6 parts: 1) Various scientific considerations; 2) Principal rules of the Method; 3) Morals and Maxims of conducting the Method; 4) Proof of God and the Soul; 5) Physics, the heart, and the soul of man and animals; 6) Prerequisites for advancing the investigation of Nature. Through autobiographical form, Descartes recounted the process of his studies in the Jesuit college at La Flèche. In addition to studying literature, theology, philosophy, science, he also sought to read all kinds of books, including banned books in libraries. As a result of devoting his youth to learning, Descartes "found himself involved in so many doubts and errors". He commented on the subjects as follow: most subjects are not built on a solid theoretical basis except for mathematics, but despite their strong and solid foundations, they are not very helpful for the development of science. On the basis of this remark, Descartes reflected on the scientific knowledge building process on the basis of observation that any building, city or nation designed or produced by a single hand, such as architect, administrator or lawyer, is more beautiful and better than what is done spontaneously. In order to get to new insights, we need to get rid of all the insights that we already have in mind, establish a new method of thinking, and from which rebuild the foundation of sciences. He laid out four rules: first, never take anything as true as we haven’t known; second, to solve difficult problems, divide them into as many parts as possible; third, thinking must be sequential, from simplicity gradually progress to complexity; and we need to assume that everything has its order; and finally, inventory what we have done to make sure of not missing anything. Like rebuilding a house, while demolishing an old house and waiting for a new house, we need a temporary house. The work of rebuilding thought also needs a "temporary house," which Descartes must followed when applying the method. There are three maxims: one, follow the laws and customs of countries in a harmonious manner, avoiding all extremes; two, be deeply consistent and determined actions; and three, try to do the best of all in our power and capabilities. With these four rules and three maxims, Descartes strived to find a truly solid new foundation for science and philosophy. That truly solid foundation means something we can't doubt anymore. He conducted this work with an experiment of thought. He tried to be skeptical of everything in the world, including his own existence, from which he then found out that one thing he couldn't be skeptical about was the fact that he was doubting. This doubting act itself is an act of thought, the Cogito. So the only true and solid basis for philosophical and scientific knowledge is Cogito or "I think." This is exactly Descartes' great discovery in this book. In the fifth part of the book, Descartes summarized the opinions that had been expressed in other works on the laws and physical phenomena of nature, and emphasized the difference between humans and animals that humans have souls and animals do not. Animals are just automatic machines, and animal activities are just the mechanical operation of organs that are organized in some way. Descartes spent the last part of the book talking about his worries about the foreground of science in the situation where the relationship between scientific truths and religious and political authority is strained. The English and Vietnamese translations of this work are now available in Ex Libris Hermes. Please stop by to pick up.
popup

Số lượng:

Tổng tiền: